The history of international criminal law has been, for the most part, a European tale.
Though it was American insistence that prevented the summary execution of hundreds or thousands of German officers after the Second World War -an approach favored by Churchill and seriously contemplated by Stalin -the United States later backed away from serious engagement in international criminal law, concerned among other things that its own citizens should not be subject to its jurisdiction. The iconic venues of crimes and their prosecution are also European: Auschwitz and Nuremberg are the touchstones, with modern counterparts in Bosnia and The Hague. The result is that in most accounts, the nonEuropean experiences of international criminal law tend to be treated as poorer and more There is, however, much to learn from closer examination of the Asian experiences of international criminal law. Not all of it is positive. But a clear-eyed view of this understudied history offers a provocative lens through which to view the possibilities and limitations of this relatively new set of laws and institutions. In particular, the pragmatic adaptation of "universal" principles in various Asian jurisdictions illustrates the inherent tension between legitimacy and effectiveness in international criminal trials. On the one hand, such trials must aspire to a legitimacy that goes beyond a state whose leaders may have engaged in unspeakable acts. At the same time, those trials require sensitivity to local context if their results are to be effective and any resolution they seek to impose is to be enduring.
It should be noted from the outset that the category "Asia" is not used here to suggest that there is a single Asian experience of or perspective on international criminal law.
Nevertheless, as a loose regional grouping, 1 Understanding this reticence depends in part on understanding the history of how international criminal law came to be used after the Second World War and subsequently applied in selective cases through the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first.
To put that experience in context, this article first surveys briefly the European history of international criminal law. As we will see, that survey would commonly be regarded as a fairly complete history of the subject. Part 2 then considers the alternative history of international criminal law as it has been experienced in Asia, focusing on the international tribunals established after the Second World War, the more recent experiments with hybrid institutions, and a few cases of domestic prosecutions. Finally, Part 3 expands on the legitimacy-effectiveness dynamic and explores whether such an account can explain the ongoing wariness of Asian states to embrace international criminal law, either through implementing it in hybrid or domestic prosecutions or submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the ICC. 1 For present purposes, the Asia-Pacific Group at the United Nations will be taken to define the list of "Asian" countries. See the table in Appendix I.
2 Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), UN Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (17 July 1998). 3 See Table 1 in Part 2. Complete statistics are provided in Appendix I.
EUROPE AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Before considering regional variation in the history of international criminal law, it is first necessary to determine the scope of our subject matter. "International criminal law" is a novel body of law that addresses an old problem. Historically, it might have been applied most properly to the crime of piracy -a problem that continues today, though it tends to be considered separately in treatments of international criminal law. 4 Today, when
we say "international criminal law," do we emphasize the "international" component: the institution that tries individuals not in a domestic court but a truly international tribunal? been interpreted and applied (or disregarded) in Asia. 7 But that would be a topic for another article.
Medieval Europe to the First World War
The history of international criminal law, in particular war crimes, is inextricably bound to the history of war. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.
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Even in the closing moments of the war, however, it was far from clear that the Allies would pursue legal avenues to punish the Nazi leadership. British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, for example, had favored the summary execution of fifty or so leading members of the Nazi apparatus. Stalin approved: in a "semi-jocular" recommendation he suggested that 50,000 German general staff officers be shot.
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This exchange is commonly dismissed as an aberration, but was a serious proposition at the time. Such an approach enjoyed the virtues of simplicity and candor.
It would spare the Allies the tedious process of organizing the mechanisms and material necessary to present a watertight case, precluding legal rationalizations and dilatory tactics that the guilty might employ to delay their judgment. And, crucially, the victors would was never ratified. 
The Former Yugoslavia
The political and legal impediments to international criminal prosecution after Nuremberg 
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This decision to commence prosecutions while the conflict continued was a substantial departure from the Nuremberg mold. Some commentators interpreted this as attempting to achieve through law what the international community was not prepared to achieve through force. 39 Others saw it as having far more modest goals: Richard 
International Criminal Court
The This is not the place for an assessment of the ICC, but it is telling that some of the main criticisms of the Court's work to date are that it is unduly focused on African crimes. 43 Underlying this challenge is the perception that it reflects a European and colonial approach to Africa. In the meantime, the United States is gradually moving from seeking cast iron guarantees that no US citizen would ever appear before the Court -with the prospect of a military strike on The Hague if one did -to reluctant acceptance that the ICC might in fact be useful in situations where more than sanctions are required but the use of force is politically or militarily impractical. 44 Meanwhile, Asian states have been largely absent from the discussions entirely and, as will described later, Asia has by far the lowest proportion of states that accept the ICC's jurisdiction at all. 
THE ASIAN EXPERIENCE
The foregoing examination of Europe and international criminal law is telling because -but for the passing mention of the Tokyo Trial and Rwanda, which were sideshows to the main 45 See infra text accompanying n 51. 46 In light of the role of the United States in prosecuting World War II atrocities, it might be argued that the term "Western" should be preferred to "European." Given the extent to which the practice of international criminal law has been focused on European geography and history, however, as well as the ongoing ambivalence of the United States towards international criminal law as it might apply to its own citizens, the term "European" will be used. In part this is due to the diversity of the continent. Indeed, the very concept of "Asia"
derives from a term used in Ancient Greece rather than any indigenous political or historic roots. Today, regional cohesion is complicated by the need to accommodate the great power interests of China, India, and Japan. 54 But the limited nature of regional bodies is consistent with a general wariness of delegating sovereignty to international organizations.
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It would be too much to suggest that Asia's experience with international criminal law defined attitudes towards international institutions more generally. Nevertheless, the extent to which that experience contributed to wariness or suspicion about international law is at least worth exploring.
Prosecutions After the Second World War
The most important and most problematic such experience concerns the various prosecutions after the Second World War. Allied military courts conducted 2,200 trials in Asia that sentenced around 3,000 Japanese to imprisonment and some 920 to death. legal foundations for the modern prosecution of war crimes, Tokyo remained for many a shadowy reminder of its limitations.
In addition to the familiar criticisms of victor's justice, the procedural flaws in
Tokyo were also the subject of scathing criticism by Justice Pal and Justice Röling -including inequality of arms, lack of time, inadequate translation services, and limitations on defense witnesses among others. 64 But more relevant for our purposes, perhaps, was the extent to which colonialism and race played a role in Tokyo -in a way that they did not in Nuremberg. Though three Asian judges were appointed (from China, India, and the Philippines) the majority of the Tribunal came from the United States and its Western allies.
No legal representative was drawn from Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Indochina, or Korea.
Given the national independence movements then underway in various colonies of
Britain, France, the Netherlands, and the United States, it was not surprising that Japanese responsibility towards Asia was framed in a manner that emphasized atrocities rather than colonialism. 
Other Prosecutions by Western Allies
In addition to the Tokyo Trial, the Allies carried out other trials that typically attract even less attention than the IMTFE. 
Russia
Russia's role in post-war trials was, for a long time, viewed in the West either through the prism of the Cold War -or it was not viewed at all, due to the unavailability of materials. 83 Politics appears to have played an important role in shaping Russian approaches to the trials, in particular unhappiness with US policies in the occupation of Japan.
In addition to criticism of the Tokyo Trial, however, Russia also convened an important trial in Khabarovsk, where twelve Japanese were charged with "manufacturing 79 PICCIGALLO, supra note 56, at 140-41; See now HONG KONG'S WAR CRIMES TRIALS (Suzannah Linton ed., 2013).
80 PICCIGALLO, supra note 56, at 141-42. 81 Id. at 174-84. 82 Id. at 201-08. 83 See, e.g., id. at 145.
and employing bacteriological weapons" 84 -the only case in which Japan's wartime biological program was the subject of criminal proceedings. 85 All twelve were convicted, but despite the seriousness of the charges, none was sentenced to death.
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Another area in which Russia had played a significant role was the role of the criminologist Aron Naumovich Trainin. As Kirsten Sellars has observed, his scholarship on crimes against peace and complicity had a significant impact on the formulation adopted in both Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
The Legacy of the Post-War Trials
The political legacy of the post-war trials in Asia is, therefore, richer than often believed but also deeply problematic.
Of particular interest to lawyers today is, among other things, the findings on command responsibility. A key reason for the distinctive approach at the IMTFE was factual. In Nuremberg the Nazi leadership had, conveniently, left significant amounts of evidence documenting orders to carry out acts that were international crimes. In responsibility, some distinctions were driven by factual differences from Nuremberg, but the colonial and racial undercurrents also played a role.
This article will not attempt to examine in depth all of these doctrinal questions. An interesting underlying theme to consider, however, is the extent to which these legal divergences can be attributed to one or more of three possible causes. Was it simply a different fact pattern that emerged in Asia, forcing a reconsideration of the law in light of these new circumstances? Or did international law adapt to "local" norms and expectations, for example concerning attitudes to individual versus group responsibility?
Or, more cynically, was law driven by political exigency -the need to ensure a swift and sure conclusion to the legal proceedings at the end of a bloody conflict?
In terms of the legacy of the post-war trials, one thing does seem clear: questions of legal doctrine were less significant in determining attitudes towards international criminal law than the political context within which the trials took place, with decolonization and race never far from the surface. That political framing helps us understand the subsequent checkered history of trials for international crimes in Asia.
Hybrid Tribunals
Wariness about international trials and the question of control over proceedings in particular became a feature of subsequent experiments in Asia with international criminal trials. This section considers the group loosely characterized as "hybrid" tribunals in Timor-Leste, Cambodia, and Lebanon. In what is now Timor-Leste, the violence that accompanied the vote for independence in September 1999 led to calls by the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor 93 Id. at 206-27. 94 Id. at 237-38. 95 Lebanon is included based on its membership in the Asia-Pacific Group of nations at the United Nations.
for an international tribunal to conduct prosecutions arising from atrocities committed after the plebiscite. On the same day, an Indonesian inquiry also recommended prosecutions of senior Indonesian military officials, but stated that they should be tried by Indonesia. Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid was reported to have said that he wanted to pre-empt an international tribunal by conducting a credible investigation and trial within Indonesia. 96 In response, the Secretary-General stated that the Security Council would "keep an eye on the process," but did not plan to establish a tribunal.
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Two major problems confronted these efforts to pursue accountability. The first was the fact that many alleged perpetrators were located within Indonesia. The second was that Timor-Leste lacked meaningful capacity to investigate or prosecute such crimes without international assistance.
The latter problem was partially addressed by creating Special Panels within the Dili District Court to try cases of "serious criminal offences" committed in 1999. The relevant offences were defined as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences, and torture. 98 The Special Panels comprised one Timorese judge and two international judges, 99 though the lack of consultation with Timorese counterparts was the subject of criticism. A Serious Crimes Unit was also established within the Public Prosecution Service. As in the case of the Special Panels, this was dominated by international staff -which may have facilitated cooperation with peacekeepers and other international actors, but undermined local legitimacy. A far greater problem was that the entire process depended on the good faith and cooperation of Indonesia, which had occupied Timor-Leste for quarter of a century. On any view, this was an optimistic premise from which to start. 101 Subsequent assessments of the Timorese experience point to the disillusionment of many in the community to the meagre outcomes of the process, and the ongoing vocal calls for justice for crimes of the past. and international conventions recognized by Cambodia" in the period [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] . 104 On the other, Cambodian judges constitute the majority in the pre-trial, trial, and appellate chambers, 105 though the two co-prosecutors are international and Cambodian. 106 The Tribunal has been marred by dysfunction and controversy. Well-intentioned efforts to allow victim participation quickly became unwieldy as victims attempted to take part in the trials. 107 Its first case was criticized for the apparent leniency meted out to one of the few people likely to stand trial. 108 Budgetary problems led to accusations of inefficiency. High-profile resignations and allegations of political influence continue to tarnish its reputation and, presumably, its legacy. 109 And, as is so often the case with transitional justice mechanisms, an underlying problem is the need to manage expectations about what any such institution can achieve in the first place. Described as a "tribunal of international character," it was originally devised at the request of the Lebanese government and modelled on the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
Following disagreements with the Lebanese government, however, the Tribunal's mandate eventually had to be formalized through a Chapter VII Security Council resolution and its location was moved to the Netherlands. The "international character" of the Tribunal is the reverse of the ECCC: located outside the country in question, its trial and appeal chambers are designed to ensure a majority of international judges.
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Its mandate, however, is to apply essentially Lebanese law 112 in prosecuting those responsible for the Hariri attack. 113 Quite apart from its questionable inclusion in the category of "Asian," then, there is a real argument as to whether such a tribunal is an "international" tribunal at all. 
Domestic Tribunals
The boundaries of our subject matter become even more blurred when considering domestic tribunals applying -or purporting to apply -international criminal law. This section will touch on only a few interesting cases. 
Indonesia (2000-)
In parallel with the UN's episodic engagement with international crimes in Timor- 
Sri Lanka?
A final example, moving forward, may yet be Sri Lanka. At present, there seems little prospect of any meaningful transitional justice mechanism, let along an internationalized one. The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission appointed by President Rajapaksa concluded its work in 2011 with a report that was deeply critical of the activities of the Tamil Tigers but found no wrongdoing on the part of the Sri Lankan military.
(In fact the Commission did depart slightly from the government line that there had been zero civilian casualties killed by government forces, by at least acknowledging that some had been killed -accidentally -in crossfire. 126 )
At an oral briefing of the Human Rights Council in September 2013, however, the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that Regrettably, the High Commissioner detected no new or comprehensive effort to independently or credibly investigate the allegations which have been of concern to the Human Rights Council. She encourages the Government to use the time between now and March 2014 to engage in a credible national process with tangible results, including the successful prosecution of individual perpetrators, in the absence of which she believes the international community will have a duty to establish its own inquiry mechanisms.
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The intimation of a deadline was immediately rejected by Sri Lanka, but sets up an interesting dynamic as there is more international scrutiny of Sri Lanka's actions -or inactions.
ASIAN CHARACTERISTICS?
The title of this article recalls the current official ideology of the Chinese Communist ideological purity that justifies one-party rule and economic pragmatism that has led to growth and prosperity.
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There is a similar tension at the heart of international criminal law. Its legitimacy derives from its universal nature, but the vast majority of the laws were written in Europe, the most important trials took place in Europe, and the academic writing is published (for the most part) in Europe. These influences were apparent in the Tokyo Trial and feature in the more critical accounts that were written subsequently. To the extent that histories of international criminal law as it has been practiced in Asia efface colonialism and racism, they are incomplete. It is the modest hope of this article to contribute to a better understanding of that history.
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But projects like this also highlight that Asian actors were not merely pawns in a colonial game. Even a brief account such as the one offered here shows that those actors were agents in their own right. In the post-war era, for example, various Asian states adopted a pragmatic approach to the role that international criminal law could play;
focused, one could say, on "output" legitimacy rather than input legitimacy. Such pragmatic adaptation of international norms to local political needs can be seen in the Chinese and Philippines approach to post-conflict trials in particular. China's initial hesitation to resolve the plight of Japanese prisoners is an example of an approach to atrocities that is often overlooked: rather than a choice between prosecutions and impunity, it is also possible to delay action. The subsequent decision to release the majority of those being held would appear to have been driven more by considerations of realpolitik than of justice, but also had to balance the need for regional stability against domestic sentiment. Concerns about losing control of criminal prosecutions or giving up sovereign control to outside powers are not, of course, unique to Asia. To be clear, it is not being suggested that there is a single set of "Asian characteristics" that explains the history of international criminal law as it has taken place in the region. Nevertheless, that history -in particular the Tokyo Trial and the other post-war trials across the region -explicitly framed international criminal law as a political rather than strictly legal phenomenon. Unlike
Nuremberg, which became the founding myth of modern international criminal law, Tokyo's embarrassing exception remained a marginal case to be framed according to the needs of the framer. This at least partly explains the manner in which more recent hybrid and domestic tribunal have sought to bend law to domestic political needs. It may also offer a partial explanation of ongoing wariness in the region about institutions that have the potential to be truly universal, such as the ICC. That wariness is not simply driven by fears that the institution will be dominated by European or American interests; it is also driven by fears that the institution may not be adaptable to local political concerns. that sought to offer justice at a time when the traditional institutions of the state that would fulfil such a function either did not exist or could not be trusted. In so doing, it has also sought to illustrate the way in which Asia's past experiences can help to understandthough not necessarily to justify -current practices in the area of international criminal law.
CONCLUSION
And so we end where we began, with the unfair burdens routinely placed on such trials. They are set the impossible task of determining the guilt or innocence of the individual defendant, recording an official history of the most traumatic events imaginable, and also marking a return to normality, to order, to law. They must also ensure that states and other stakeholders see them as legitimate, both in the sense that their origins are pure and their outcomes are sound. No trials can achieve such lofty goals. And yet somehow they must. 
